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ABSTRACT
According to the communist doctrine, every person is guaranteed the
right to a home. Every Soviet leader has attempted to fulfil this task,
yet the housing problem in the Soviet Union continues to be the most
critical of any industrialized country. In 1985 President Gorbachev
declared housing a primary objective of his economic restructuring
package known to the world as Perestroika. His decree stated that a
home must be provided for every family by the year 2000. In order
to evaluate the likelihood of Gorbachev obtaining this goal, field
research in Leningrad was undertaken to analyze the supply side of
housing production. Several critical obstacles were discovered to
meeting this goal in Leningrad: capital investment has steadily
decreased over time, the centralized production process is highly
inefficient, extreme material shortages exist, the majority of the
labor force is unskilled.
During the last three years, the multitude of reforms passed under
Perestroika have had a counterproductive effect. The general
confusion created at both the state and local level has caused existing
systems to break down. In order to alleviate the housing shortage,
changes must occur at both the state level, through restructuring the
basic economy and creating price mechanisms, and at the local level.
Specifically, in Leningrad the following initiatives must be
implemented: the centralized production system must be dismantled,
alternative materials to concrete must be developed, the labor force
must be trained and educated to develop skills, access to capital must
be made available to individuals and enterprises.
The inefficiencies of the housing production process are mere
symptoms of the larger problem, the basic structure of the political
and economic system. Due to the complexities involved in creating a
new system, the short term perspective for meeting the housing
demand is not promising. However, if Leningrad is successful in
implementing the initiatives outlined above, change will occur.
Thesis supervisor: James McKellar
Title: Senior Lecturer, Department of Architecture
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INTRODUCTION:
The first premise of all human existence, is ... that man
must be in a position to live in order to make history.
But life involves before anything else eating and
drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things.
Marx1
The peoples' right to housing is guaranteed by Article 44
of the Soviet Constitution 2
The government of the Soviet Socialist Republic has for many
decades sought to alleviate their housing shortage by setting
ambitious goals. In 1985 during the 27th Party Congress, President
Gorbachev declared such a goal for his government: every family in
the Soviet Union is to have a home by the year 2000.
While Gorbachev's declaration on housing may sound like a final cure
to the ailing industry, historical precedents indicate otherwise. In
1961 the XXII Party Congress published a doctrine which had a
section entitled, 'Solving the Housing Problem and Conditions of Daily
Life'. "In this document the Party leadership noted that the most
acute problem to be solved, if the standard of living of the population
were to be raised, was housing. It declared that by 1971 the housing
shortage would have to come to an end, and that those families who
were still living in overcrowded and generally poor living conditions
in 1961 would have new flats." 3 Today however, "...the USSR has the
worst housing shortage of any industrialized nation." 4 Obviously the
goal set by the XXII Party Congress was never realized.
1 Marx K. and Engels F., The German Ideology (London, Lawrence & Wishart,
1965), pg. 39
2 Wolfe, Gregory B., Some Observations on Housing in the Soviet Union and the
Peoples' Republic of China, 1988, pg. 1
3 Andrusz, Gregory D., Housing & Urban Development in the USSR, (State
University of New York Press), pg. 1
4 Morton, Henry W., The Housing Game, 1985, pg. 61
In order to understand the difficulty of achieving this most recent
goal, it is imperative to understand the magnitude of the current
housing problem. Field research specific to Leningrad revealed that
in 1985 there were 1,660,000 families (or 4,90,000 inhabitants)
living in 1,320,000 existing flats in greater Leningrad. 125,000 of
these families (or 400,000 people) had less than 5 square meters per
person. In addition, 655,000 families, or roughly 39% of the
population lived in communal flats where the bathroom and kitchen
facilities were shared.5  According to the LENNIITAG Institute,
660,000 housing units must be constructed in Leningrad between
1985-2000 if Gorbachev is to achieve his goal of providing a home
for every family in that city. Michael Berezin, the Director of
Research at LENNIITAG, noted that current production of housing in
Leningrad, which is operating at maximum capacity, is close to
27,000 units/year. In order to meet Gorbachev's goal, production
must nearly double to 44,000 units/year.
Is Gorbachev and his grand plans for Perestroika6 really any
different than any other leader of the Soviet Union? Are his plans to
construct 25 million new housing units in the Soviet Union feasible
given the existing construction system, the lack of infrastructure, the
poor state of the Soviet economy and the notorious lack of building
materials which has consistently plagued the USSR? Are these
inefficiencies that effect the housing problem merely a symptom of a
larger problem?
This paper, through a review of historic precedents and an analysis
of the existing centralized construction process in Leningrad,
concludes that the provision of housing for every family by the year
2000 is impossible. The following specific reasons why Gorbachev
will not meet his goal for this city can be cited:
5 Berezin, Michael, Research Director LENNIITAG Institute, Leningrad.(June 6,
1990 and June 12, 1990)
6 Restructuring of the economic management of the Soviet Union - Abel
Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika. The Future of the Soviet Economy. Harper and
Rowe Publishers 1989, pg.1
. The centralized control over all housing production is
highly inefficient. The industrialized concrete panel
system, once viewed as the solution, is now a major
source of the production problem.
. Material shortages are extreme. Other than the basic
materials for the manufacturing of concrete panels,
building materials are virtually nonexistent. Wood for
example is not available.
. Labor is unskilled and lacks motivation. Construction
laborers are generally untrained rural workers.
- The Infrastructure is in a sorry state of decomposition.
Costs for new housing construction will be matched by
costs to improve utilities and other infrastructure
elements.
- Recent reforms have served only to increase confusion.
During the past three years, Leningrad has seen an
acceleration in the deterioration of housing and
infrastructure. There is no evidence that current
reforms are bringing relief.
In order to overcome the housing shortage, change must take place,
both at the state level, through the restructuring of the economy of
the country and the creation of pricing mechanisms, and at the local
level. The following delineates the prerequisites to change specific to
Leningrad:
. THE CENTRALIZED SYSTEM - The system for planning
and constructing housing must be realigned. A
multiplicity of house producing enterprises must be
established. These enterprises could be owned by the
local government, co-operatives, and hopefully private
organizations. Joint ventures could also be utilized.
- BUILDING MATERIALS - Alternative materials to
concrete must be developed. Wood, due to the
abundance of forests in Russia, would be a logical
choice.
. LABOR - A means for training and educating the labor
force must be implemented. This may require foreign
assistance. There is no construction labor force in the
entire country with experience other than in pre-cast
concrete.
- ACCESS TO CAPITAL - A system must be established
which could extend mortgages and loans to individuals
and enterprises.
While this list of prerequisites for change represents the most glaring
obstacles inherent in the system at the local level, it is by no means
inclusive. The housing problem is of such magnitude that local
governments alone will not be able to meet the back-log. State
resources must be utilized. An added complexity lies in the necessity
of implementing so many of these initiatives simultaneously if they
are to be effective.
This paper will explore the following:
* Chapter I - A historical. overview of housing in the Soviet Union
since the advent of communism will emphasize historical precedents.
The declining investment of capital throughout Soviet history has
played a significant role in the inability to meet housing demand.
Recent reforms passed by Gorbachev's government have made
attempts to change history, but with little effect.
- Chapter II - This chapter reviews the state role in housing
production, with an examination of the inefficiencies that a
centralized system breeds.
- Chapter III - Opportunities for alternative means of housing
production do currently exist. They are co-operative enterprises,
self-initiated builders (individuals and families), and foreign
contractors. These three groups are analyzed in terms of their
current contribution to the housing industry, how they can be
utilized in the future to alleviate shortages and increase the
construction quality. Access to building materials, the lifeline for
these builders, will also be discussed.
. Chapter IV - A look at the lessons learned, and the future
forecast for housing in Leningrad.
Research for this thesis was restricted by time and available
resources and to conditions in Leningrad. Information was obtained
through interviews with individuals actively engaged in the planning
and construction of housing in Leningrad. Interviews were
conducted through interpreters with varying degrees of English
proficiency. Although every effort has been made to correlate
information, there may be aspects of these interviews which have
not been fully understood.
CHAPTER I. A PROFILE OF HOUSING PRODUCTION
Section 1.) Historical Perspective
"According to Lenin, a rich man's flat was one in which
the number of rooms was equal to or exceeds the number
of persons permanently living there." 7
The revolution of 1917 abolished all private ownership on ideological
grounds. During the early years of communism, housing policy
consisted of redistributing space rather than constructing new
buildings. Lenin saw this as a means to redistribute the wealth on an
equitable basis.
During the twenties, workers returned to live in cities to capitalize on
the industrialization which was taking place. By 1926, socialized
housing accounted for only 47.7% of the per capita living space while
personal housing made up the remainder.8 (Personal housing in this
context refers to the assignment of rights to land and houses. These
rights last in perpetuity and are transferable. However, these rights
can not be bought or sold legally, but in Leningrad it was evident
that a housing market exists through the shadow market.) The
urban population during the twenties blossomed from 20.9 million in
1920 to 26.3 million in 1926. The increase in demand caused the per
capita living space to drop from 6.4 meters in 1923, to 5.8 meters in
1926.9 As the housing shortage became more critical, new solutions
were sought.
During the 1930's, the concept of industrializing housing production
was introduced by German architectural teams. It was during this
time that the Bauhaus was espousing it's theory of the benefits to
mankind of the machine age. Their ideology prefaced a celebration
of the combination of art and technology. An exhibition by Mies Van
7 Andrusz, pg 13
8 Andrusz, pg 22
9 Andrusz, pg 17
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de Rohe in 1927, glorifying worker housing, "Weissenhof Werkbund",
was a forerunner of this movement. Simultaneously, Le Corbusier
was designing his "Machines for Living" in France. Both of these
projects embraced the worker as hero and served as an appropriate
model for the communist cause. As communism and socialism gained
momentum, the artifacts of the bourgeoisie were being eliminated.
"It had been decided...that pitched roofs and cornices represented the
'crowns' of the old nobility, which the Bourgeoisie spent most of their
time imitating. Therefore, henceforth, there would be only flat
roofs;...no cornices, no overhanging eaves". 10  The new architectural
style of the Bauhaus sought to be honest both in material usage and
architectural form. Architects during this time even renounced
consumer preference. "The architects acted as the workers' cultural
benefactors. There was no use consulting [the consumers] directly,
since as Gropius had pointed out, they were as yet intellectually
undeveloped" 11. The Bauhaus was thus one of the seminal influences
for the advent of industrialized housing production in the USSR.
The development of an industrialized housing form appeared to be
the panacea to cure all the ailments of housing in the 1920's and
30's. By utilizing a centralized political system to oversee the
allocation of building resources and the development of technology, it
was thought that great economies of scale could be achieved. Three
significant historical aspects, as cited by Gregory Andrusz,
significantly contributed to the evolution of the industrialized
construction process: 1).the economic backwardness of the first
socialist state; 2).the existing low level of education and shortage of
qualified workers; and 3).an external threat which necessitated a
high level of expenditure on defence. 1 2  During the second World
War, bombing destroyed roughly one-sixth of the country's urban
housing stock, with another one-sixth severely damaged. 1 3. This
10 Wolfe, Tom, From Bauhaus to Our House, Washington Square Press 1981, pg.
24
11 Wolfe, pg. 32
12 Andrusz, pg. 3
13 Andrusz, pg. 19
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massive destruction heightened the magnitude of the housing
shortage. In 1948, in order to combat the ravages left by the war,
the government issued a decree to encourage individuals to construct
their own homes. As history will reveal, this decree, was nothing
more than a verbal proclamation; no mechanism for facilitating
individual builders was ever implemented.
It should be noted that under Stalin's regime (1929-1953),
traditional methods of constructing buildings on site remained in
place. Trades such as brick layers, stone masons, and building
craftsmen were still utilized. However, Stalin's era was characterized
as creating the 'wedding-cake' style which epitomized gothic revival.
Although the 'wedding-cake' utilized high caliber architecture and
quality construction methods, the time consuming designs and the
use of materials such as marble and granite, were classified as lavish
and unnecessary in the face of an extreme housing shortage.
By 1950, self-initiated builders were able to contribute 30.9% of the
new housing stock which amounted to 6.4 million square meters. 14
However, the state authorities realized that massive amounts of
housing were needed immediately and that production must be
significantly increased. Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the state
increased its efforts to build factories for the production of housing
components, thus the panelized system of production was firmly
implanted. These factory-built panels overcame three main
difficulties in housing production; lack of skilled workers, lack of
standardization of previous housing forms (it was feared that this
was creating inequality), and lack of ability, due to slow production,
to meet the demand. A paramount factor of the communist doctrine
calls for the equality of all individuals. This translated into
maintaining similar standards of living for the populace.
Industrialization met these challenges; it required fewer workers
than traditional methods, and little or no skill was needed. The
repetition of the panel sizes allowed every housing unit to be created
12
14 Andrusz, pg. 21
exactly the same so that equality could be maintained, and lastly, the
process was very expedient.
During the sixth five year plan (1956-1960), while the state was
mobilizing factories for production, there appeared to be strong
simultaneous support for the self-initiated builders. A goal was set
for 34%, or 113 million square meters to be built by individual
means. Unfortunately, the state's words fell hollow; no means for
implementation was established to support this decree. For example
no mechanism was created to allocate financial and material
resources to the self-initiated builders. The local agencies were also
less than helpful; they allocated plots of land in areas with no public
infrastructure, many in fact were located in swamps. As a result, the
self-initiated builders were able to construct only 25% of the housing
stock during this period. It became apparent during the early sixties
that the state lacked commitment to the self-initiated builders.
Funds and materials were being channelled into the factories for the
production of concrete panels. In 1963 the state closed the door on
the builders by prohibiting the production of single family homes in
cities with less than 100,000 people. By 1969 construction by self-
initiated home builders dropped to 10.4%.
Towards the end of the sixties, planners, architects and bureaucrats
alike recognized that the mass produced concrete panel system did
not create a satisfactory environment. They also realized that this
process dictated a standard of living which fell well below that of
Western countries. The standardization of the housing created
equality amongst the people, but it is equality in poverty. 1 5
However, change required money and the military budget was of top
priority. It drained all financial resources and limited technical
advancement in all areas outside of defense. During this time small
improvements were made to the building facades; ceramic tile was
added to the exteriors and building forms were altered slightly.
15 Nikolilaschenko, Boris, Deputy Chief of GENPLAN, Leningrad (June 13, 1990)
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These changes increased the cost of construction, but not the quality
of life for the residents.
Capital Investment in Housing in the USSR. 1918-1980
(in comparable prices) - (figure 1)1 6
Actual Investment
Year (millions rubles)
1918-28 2835
1st FYP (1929-32) 1346
2nd FYP (1933-37) 2516
3rd FYP (1938-41) 3470
1941-1946 3073
4th FYP (1946-50) 9206
5th FYP (1951-55) 17794
6th FYP (1956-60) 39454
7th FYP (1961-65) 45218
8th FYP (1966-70) 59696
9th FYP (1971-75) 75354
10th FYP (1976-80) 86305
1976 16504
1977 17013
1978 17522
1979 17332
1980 17934
SOURCES: Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSRv 1978g., pg. 342-3
N. kh SSSR v 1979g. pg. 366-7
N. kh. SSSR v 1980g., pg. 336-7
Percentage of total
Capital Investment
64.3
15.4
12.8
17.0
15.0
19.4
19.8
23.5
18.6
17.2
15.3
13.6
14.0
13.9
13.5
13.3
13-4
By the 1970's, capital investment for housing was substantially
increased from 59,696 rubles during the 8th five year plan (1966-
70), to 86,305 rubles during the 10th five year plan (1976-80).
However the budget, as a percentage of total capital investment fell
from 17.2% to 13.6%. (See figure 1). Much of this had to do with the
difficulties involved with changing the pre-cast concrete panel
system. The industrialized process had created a huge infrastructure
which was inflexible to other building systems. The low skill level of
the workers, and the lack of incentive to explore new systems had
also contributed to the stagnation of the system. In addition, the
seventies, under the reign of Brezhnev, was a time of great
corruption. Brezhnev's 'more lenient rules' allowed for the formation
16 Andrusz, pg. 20
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of a 'building mafia'. The builders (members of the
STROICOMMITTEE, to be explained in Chapter II), like most Soviet
agencies, have quotas which must be fulfilled. In their case, quotas
were determined by the amount of money spent. The perversity of
this system encouraged builders to pursue the most costly
construction methods at minimum effort; production thus suffered.
Meanwhile, the self-initiated builders, who provided almost one
third of the housing in 1950, were almost demobilized by the
eighties. In 1981, individuals were responsible for erecting 8.0% of
the housing stock. The state, by not establishing any means to
obtain financing or building supplies, virtually eliminated this viable
source of production.
Today, there is considerable debate about the continued use of the
high rise concrete panel method. According to Valentin Nazarov, the
director of GENPLAN in Leningrad, there are two main reasons why
the state will continue to build these high rise structures. First, the
high rise allows for greater density of people and services. For
example, markets and schools are located within a short walking
distance of most apartment buildings. Secondly, because there are
very few cars, the general populace must rely upon public
transportation. The Soviet Union has roughly 50 cars per 1000
people, most Western countries have 400 cars per 1000 people, (the
US has 600/1000 people).
The panelized system, once the panacea for the ailing housing
industry, has today become a significant part of the problem.
However, serious impediments still exist to fundamental change. The
implementation of the industrialized system required the
construction of a huge factory infrastructure. This production system
is virtually inflexible for any other type of building process.
Supporting this industry requires tremendous financial and material
resources and has siphoned resources from the development of other
methods. The system, although acknowledged for it's inadequacies,
is still strongly supported by communist party hard-liners such as
15
Valentin Nazarov. Such people believe that there is no other way to
provide high density living. Certainly Europe, Japan and the United
States can provide examples of high density, low rise structures.
Japan in particular is a good example of a population with low car
ownership per capita, and extremely dense living conditions in 2 to 3
story structures.
The industrialized concrete panel system is not likely to change
without funding for the development of alternate forms of housing.
However while, the state allotted 64.3% of its total capital investment
to housing, from 1918 to 1928, in 1980 only 13.4% of the budget was
dedicated to the cause. 17 Although the state government declared
housing to be a top priority in 1961 with the XXII Party Congress,
and again in 1985 with Gorbachev's proclamation, the decrease in the
housing budget (figure 1) clearly indicates that proclamations from
the government are not indications of subsequent actions.
Historical precedents play a telling role for viewing the present. In
the last three years, Gorbachev's government has passed numerous
laws to address radical restructuring, but their effect has been
minimal.
Section 2.) Effect of Proposed Reforms
The advent of Perestroika has initiated a great number of new ideas
regarding what restructuring should mean. In some instances, new
laws have been passed, in others, the ideas are still on political
drawing boards; still other ideas are mere talk amongst the
disgruntled intelligentsia. As history has pointedly revealed, decrees
from the state seldom are more than rhetoric. A prime case in point
is the purely verbal support for the self-initiated builders.
The movement for restructuring is occurring both at the top through
bureaucrats, and at the bottom through grass root citizen affiliations
In Leningrad this is evident through the recent democratic elections
16
17 Andrusz, pg. 20-21
which have put non-party members into power. These politicians
are acting on behalf of their constituents' desires, not the state
governments'. Although in Leningrad there are many innovative
politicians who are pushing for change, there are also many party
hard liners who, fearful of losing their power base, are pushing for
slower change, and even curtailment or Perestroika. Some say
Gorbachev has gone too far and that the reins need to pulled in. It
was very evident in Leningrad that the populace is becoming restless
as stores provide fewer goods and the decay of their city continues
unchecked.
According to Abel Aganbegyan, three laws make up the basis of this
new economic movement: "the Law on State Enterprises and
Conglomerates (in force since 1 January 1988); the Law on
Cooperatives (in force since 1 July 1988); the Law on Individual
Labor Activity (in force since 1 May 1987)"18 Mr Aganbegyan
maintains that "The number of centrally planned tasks has decreased
sharply as the new economic rules for enterprises have gained
importance. The whole system of financing is being regularized. We
have established new specialized banks whose purpose is to gauge
the needs of enterprises and organizations and to serve those needs.
We have begun a reorganization of the administration in order to
simplify the administrative structure, abolish unnecessary branches,
and reduce the central and republican apparatus by 30-50
percent." 19  To innocent eyes, these initiatives sound revolutionary.
However, establishing banks and having them operate effectively are
two different things. Valerie Antonov, the deputy managing director
of LENNIITAG in Leningrad, revealed that there is one central bank
which does lend money to individuals to buy materials for building
single family homes. However, the amount which can be borrowed is
limited to less than half the cost of the building supplies. By the end
of 1989, due to the shortage of rubles at the state level, 130,000 loan
18 Aganbegyan, Abel, Inside Perestroika. The Future of the Soviet Economy.
Harper and Rowe Publishers 1989, pg. 2
19 Aganbegyan, pg. 3
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applications could not be filled. Mr. Antonov continued that some
commercial banks were currently being formed, however, because
the laws were so new, they have very little capital to work with.
Another brash reform recently was heralded in the New York Times,
Moscow Acts to Give Tenants the Apartment They Live In. The
article states that the "City Council, opting for a utopian antidote to
communism, has voted to take the city's entire apartment housing
stock from the state's control and give it away free to millions of
hard-suffering tenants." 20 This reform, if put into effect, would be a
revolutionary move to creating private property. In general people
we encountered in Leningrad would welcome this change, however
people have become hesitant to believe anything. As Cline noted, "No
one quite knows how or whether this can come true, but the council
is advising the city to trust in the new powers of self-rule and await
further details."" 21
As history reveals, the government is notorious for creating reforms
which are not accompanied by a means of implementation. All of
these reforms offer a top down solution and still retain state control,
although in a different form. If the state government is sincere in its
motives, a system which empowers the grass roots organizations
needs to be created.
An analysis of the existing housing production system is incomplete
without a historical overview. As depicted, history does repeat itself.
20 Clines, Francis X. Moscow Acts to Give Tenants the Apartment They Live In,
The New York Times, July 8, 1990, pg. 1
21 Clines, pg. 1
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has the [highest] authority with respect to territorial planning.. .If the
ministry wants to expand the plant, but the city has other plans for
that land or does not wish to provide housing, transportation, and
utilities in that vicinity for the additional workers...[then the Ministry
is blocked]." 23
The centralized form of government keeps the power of the control
at the top through management by decree. The lower branches of
government such as the City Soviets and Raions (districts), must
comply with and act in accordance to the higher jurisdiction of the
Supreme Soviet. "Centralism provides a consistent national economic
plan for the development of the local economy. The plan is approved
by the Supreme Soviets. It stipulates the basic development policies
of the local economy, and specifies the relations between higher
government and the local management organs in the field of housing
construction, local industry, health care, and other areas of economic
and socio-cultural life." 2 4
In order to understand how the system really works, it is important
to understand the written text of how the system is suppose to work.
Certainly many criticisms have been voiced regarding the
inadequacies of a centralized system. Centralization creates a
monopoly of control with no checks and balances. It breeds
bureaucracies which "...develop parochial perspectives from
information gathered from their own resources and processed
through their own channels, and adopt strategies which promote
their own self interest and guard against attempts to reduce the
importance of their functions, or to decrease the resources allocated
to them." 2 5  Or as Michael Berezin, the Research Director at
LENNIITAG put it, "the system is like a robot eating a bowl of
cherries. Every movement is dictated by the computer
program...you can't kiss a woman like this!"
23Savas, E.S., Kaiser, J.A., Moscow's City Government (Praeger Publishers), pg
19
24 Savas, Kaiser, pg. 21
25 Morton, Henry W., The Housing Game, (The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn,
1985), pg. 62
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CHAPTER II THE STATE ROLE IN HOUSING
PRODUCTION
Section 1.) The Centralized Planning Process
"All power in the USSR belongs to the people... The people
exercise governmental power through the Soviets
[Councils] of People's Deputies which form the
governmental foundation of the USSR...All other bodies
are under the control of, and are accountable to, the
Soviet of People's Deputies..."
The Constitution of the Soviet Union (Article 145)
In accordance with the statutes of the Constitution, there is a law
entitled, 'Basic Rights and Obligations of the City and the Municipal
Raion Councils of Workers' Deputies'. According to these laws, "...the
district and the city soviets are the government organs in their
territory, and, as such, they decide within the limits of their
authority all local problems on behalf of the entire government and
the working people of the city or Raion." 2 2  The Raion
(Administrative District or region) and the city soviets (executive and
legislative bodies of the City Council) are responsible for
implementing the policy of the party and the government (see
figure 2, pg. ). These organizations decide all policy relative to city or
regional economic development, municipal services, and the
coordination of all organizations concerned with housing and
municipal construction.
The Soviet organizational system is termed as one of 'higher sub-
ordination'. It is a hierarchical system whereby there is always a
higher authority which any given agency must report to. This
structure is inherently difficult to work with efficiently. For
example, "...an enterprise such as a steel mill is under the authority
of a national-level Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, but the city soviet
22 Savas, E.S., Kaiser, J.A., Moscow's City Government, (Praeger Publishers) pg.
19
19
Long range planning is a critical part of a centralized system. One
organization, GOSPLAN, is responsible for carrying out planning for
the entire country. Such plans in the Soviet Union become law. Once
they are created, they may be in place for 10, 20 or even 40 years.
Plans are generally not adjusted for changing demographics, or
changes in life style (ie. elderly people preferring to live alone rather
than with family). "Planning is the official religion of the state. The
plan is pervasive, all embracing and sacrosanct. It is cited as the
ultimate authority and in effect, has the force of law. Whereas in the
United States the chief virtue of planning, such as it is, is generally
considered to be the process, in the Soviet Union it is the product
that reigns supreme."26
The obsession with planning has clouded the larger issue of
implementation. The specific agencies which control planning and
the ability to implement these plans are GOSPLAN and GOSNOB. The
specific role these agencies play will become evident in the following
description of the flow of money and materials.
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26 Savas, Kaiser, pg. xx
FLOW OF MONEY & MATERIALS
(figure 2)27
LENINGRAD COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE I ISPOLCO
COMMITTEE I (LegislaturE
IMATERIALS
$ 1$
BANK ACCOUNT
I STROICOMMITTEE
MANAGEMENT
27 Linov, Vladimer, Chief Architect, LENNIITAG.Institute, Leningrad (June 6,
and June 10, 1990)
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Section 2.) The Allocation of Money and Materials
Figure 2 delineates the chain of decision making as well as the flow
of money and materials.
G OS P L A N is the central planning agency in the Soviet Union. It is
responsible for deciding all issues for the country from where a
power plant should be built to how many pencils each agency should
receive. Specific to this study, GOSPLAN determines the amount of
housing each city or district will construct in a given year, and the
amount of financial resources necessary to fulfill this plan.
For example, once GOSPLAN has decided that Leningrad is to receive
X amount of rubles to build Y square meters of housing, the plans are
then given to GOSNOB to determine the amount of building
materials to be allocated to Leningrad. The plans for the housing
must receive final approval from the Soviet of Ministers, before
being passed to the Leningrad Council for implementation. GOSNOB is
the central agency for controlling all material distribution. It also
provides materials for military and industrial construction as well as
housing. Housing has traditionally been the lowest priority due to
the government's concern for a strong defense and dedication to
large scale industrial production methods.
Section 3.) The Production Process In Leningrad
GOSPLAN and GOSNOB constitute the state level authorities which
give directives regarding housing production and material supply.
Implementation takes place at the local level through the
LENINGRAD CITY COUNCIL.
The City Council (or City Soviet), is comprised of an executive and
legislative body (or Ispolcom). The legislative body is elected
through a voting process by the general populace. Until recently, the
constituency in Leningrad was offered the 'choice' of voting for one
candidate, usually a hard line Party member. In April 1990, multi-
party elections were held, and many liberals (not closely aligned
with the Party) were voted in. The executive committee has
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traditionally been nominated from within the legislative body. In
the past, the legislative body would 'rubber stamp' the proposal put
forward by the executive committee. This system gave no power to
the legislative body, and provided no checks and balances. However,
Perestroika is affecting local politics to a minimum degree. In June
1990 the executive committee appointed Alexander Schehknoff, a
man known for his liberal politics. An equally popular individual
(Subcheck) will head up the legislative branch. These newly elected
leaders have in the last month divorced themselves from the
Communist Party. For the first time the city government in
Leningrad will be governed by non-party members. _ The city will
have a system of checks and balances, and elected leaders will be
responsible to their constituents.
Within the Leningrad City Council there is a commissioner who is
responsible for securing from GOSNOB the necessary building
materials for the construction of apartment buildings. At this point
several holes begin to appear in the process. The amount of money
allocated by GOSPLAN may not correspond to the amount of
materials necessary for proper construction. Or money may be given
without regard to the availability of materials. When money is
allocated, it is really nothing more than a number on a paper. No
money is exchanged. As Vitrenko Leonidovich, Head of the
Leningrad City Council Planning Commission noted, "...money doesn't
really exist; you don't go to a shop to buy, but to be given goods." For
example, it may be stipulated that 1 million rubles should purchase
1000 tons of concrete. However, material shortages may dictate that
only 900 tons are given. Due to scarcity, the entire building process
is controlled by material availability. Money, although readily
obtainable from GOSPLAN, has virtually no significance in the
material supply line.
At this point, according to Vitrenko Leonidovich, the commissioner
has two choices. The first is termed 'Russian Economizing". Methods
for economizing include decreasing the amount of concrete utilized
per panel or making the floor slabs thinner. This saves money and
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materials in the short run, but reduces the life of the structure
causing severe long term costs. The second option is known as blatt.
It is a process of utilizing connections and delicate negotiations to
secure the needed materials. Often these negotiations serve as a
means for securing a flat for a factory worker, or family member.
Although blatt would fall under the category of extortion in this
country, in the Soviet Union blatt is a necessary and ubiquitous tool
for conducting business. Michael Berezin 28, quoting a 19th century
writer noted, "If people obeyed the laws of this country, it would be
impossible to live here."
Once the financial and material resources have been obtained., the
commissioner will sign a contract with the STROICOMMITTEE. This
committee approximates a construction administrator and has the
authority to make final approvals on all building designs. The
STROICOMMITTEE then contracts the with TRESTCOMMITTEE for
construction workers and the production of the concrete panels.
THE FACTORIES
The factories obtain the allotted materials, secured by the
Commissioner of Housing at the Leningrad Council, from GOSNOB in
order to produce the concrete panels. In Leningrad, there are four
factories for construction. One factory produces industrial buildings.
The other three specialize in apartment buildings of different
heights, (4-10 stories, 10-12 stories, or 12-17 stories). Due to the
out-dated equipment and the lack of developed skills amongst the
employees, the factories are virtually incapable of diversifying their
product. Periodic changes are made regarding size, but the material
and basic attributes remain unchanged.
Factories are a very strong link in the building process, not only
because they produce the concrete panels, but also because they
have access to materials. The Soviet economy, due to a lack of price
mechanisms, has created a system based on material procurement.
28 Berezin, Michael, Research Director, LENNIITAG Institute, Leningrad
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Thus access to materials provides a power base for obtaining other
necessary items. This has induced a hoarding mentality amongst
production based industries. Over the last few years, as material
shortages have increased, the stockpiles of materials in factories has
also increased. This has aggravated existing material shortages and
created an artificial inflation. As materials become more scarce, they
become more valuable on the black market. Factory workers have
thus been extracting materials from the housing production line, and
selling or bartering these materials for their own betterment. A
multitude of state built apartment buildings currently sit idle in mid-
construction because much of material needed to finish them has
been sold out the factory back door!
THE MATERIALS
Of the 80% share of the housing built by state sponsored
construction, 80% of the units are made from pre-cast concrete
panels, with the remainder made from brick. The panels are made in
a factory and trucked to the site where they are then hoisted into
position by a crane. The panels are suspended from an inside
concrete frame and serve as a curtain wall. The building's structure
is carried on bearing walls located along the double loaded corridors,
and in the party walls between units. Bearing walls are composed of
reinforced concrete and are utilized on buildings up to 17 stories.
The panels themselves are composed of air-entrained concrete. The
standard size is 600 cm (19'-8") in length, 24 cm (9.5") thick, and
120-150 cm (4'-5') in height. Air-entrained concrete has a porous
nature which, according to Alexander Tovbeen, Chief Architect of
LENPROJECT, gives this material an insulation value similar to wood.
Due to the lack of availability of any other type of insulation, this is
quite important. The inside face of the panel is finished by adhering
wallpaper. One major disadvantage of the panel is that it's porous
nature causes it to decompose quickly when exposed to moisture and
extreme temperatures. Leningrad has a very moist climate with up
to 18 rain days per month. The temperature swings annually from
12-80 degrees, Fahrenheit. When asked about the expected life span
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of these panels, Alexander Tovbeen noted that deterioration
generally begins after three years. This was quite evident in
Leningrad where balconies are literally crumbling off building
facades. It is also very difficult to repair or replace the panels. The
building life is projected at 20 years. However, these panels are
quickly produced, and the standardization of parts makes them quick
and easy to assemble on site which decreases the number of workers
exposed to the weather. This method of panelized construction does
not require a high skill level to assemble. The decision to utilize the
panels is made by bureaucrats from either the STROI- or
TRESTCOMMITEE.
The centralized system does not promote the exploration of
alternative building techniques. However, 15 years ago pre-stressed
concrete was tested, but the process was too complex for an unskilled
work force, so it was eliminated. Poured in place concrete was also
reviewed. Although this method was less expensive than the panel
construction, it was vetoed by the builders (TREST- or
STROICOMMITTEE). The builders prefer simplistic, yet costly
methods of production so that they can meet their quotas faster, and
with minimum effort. (Quotas are based on the amount of money
spent, not the job done). Wood seems like a likely building material
as well, due to the abundance of forests. However, wood because it is
one of the few resources traded for hard currency, is cut for export
only. Wood is only utilized sparingly in the USSR for window and
door frames.
THE ARCHITECTS
Each factory has a group of architects responsible for preparing
drawings as necessary. According to Alexander Tovbeen, "...every
year minor changes are made to the design to reflect current
technology". Every 5-7 years, a new 'series' is created which
"modernizes the principal of the design". The production facility at
the factory is responsible for deciding when a new series should be
initiated. The main priority for each new series, as described by Mr.
Tovbeen, is to 'provide a higher level of comfort' to the populace.
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The process for the design of the series is similar to that in the
United States: schematic design, design development, approval from
the STROICOMMITTEE, working drawings, development of form work
for construction, manufacture form work, analysis of technology for
production, production of prototype, begin mass scale production.
This process takes roughly ten years to complete. Once the assembly
line is set-up, each building takes only 6 months from start to finish,
if the materials are available. A design for a series may be used an
unlimited number of times. Although there are many factories in the
USSR producing different designs, it should be noted that the
buildings vary only superficially. The basic building form remains
virtually unchanged across the country. In driving through the
suburbs of Leningrad, one is visually accosted by the sight of
building after shapeless building sitting awkwardly on the land.
There is no local context or individual building definition. There is
no scale or sense of place, or even an identifiable entry. One
inhabitant of an apartment building revealed that mothers often tie
colored ribbons to their doors so that children will be able to find
their way back home.
Through our research, it was apparent that many architects in
Leningrad are capable of designing quality buildings and
environments. The problem with trying to get quality designs built
is that everything must be approved by the STROICOMMITTEE. The
STROICOMMITTEE is basically composed of bureaucrats with little to
no knowledge of architecture, engineering, or construction. In
general committees such as this are composed of party members, or
relatives of party members. Michael Berezin, the Director of
Research at LENNIITAG, cited the following tale of working with the
STROICOMMITTEE. LENPROJECT (a design institute) proposed a
master plan for the location of 25-30 units of housing. This plan was
submitted to the Chief Engineer of the STROICOMMITTEE for
approval. The engineer said that the dispersal of the buildings
throughout the site would be too difficult to build. Instead he
proposed grouping all the units in a large polygon formation.
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Solutions such as this lack all sensitivity to the landscape and the
users.
The production process for housing has traditionally been controlled
by bureaucrats. Each of these bureaucrats is judged according to
how well they fulfill their annual quotas in their departments.
According to Michael Berezin, "departments don't see reality, they
just do their narrowly defined jobs." For example, the factories must
produce so many concrete panels. The industrialized system allows
them to meet their quota more easily. It is irrelevant that the panels
begin to corrode in three years. The lack of accountability created by
the quota system has caused a piecemeal approach to producing
housing. The vision and synchronization of the process has been lost.
This is the root of the problem of the system.
The production process involves the Leningrad City Council, and the
factories. The actual construction of the buildings on site involves
construction workers to pour foundations and erect the panels, and
building inspectors to give the final sign-off.
Section 4.) The Construction Process
The Foundations
Leningrad is known as the Venice of the East. There are numerous
canals in the old city, and there is a very high water table throughout
the region. Most of the city has been constructed on land fill. Given
these soil conditions, concrete structures are far from ideal due to
their immense weight. In order to support them, it is necessary to
sink deep foundations which are very expensive. For the
foundations, it is sometimes necessary to dig 30 meters (90 feet) to
find soils which will bear the weight. Generally reinforced concrete
piles are utilized. According to Vladimer Linov, the Chief Architect at
LENNIITAG, the technology for caissons does exist but, because
caissons are cheaper, the builders have opted not to use them (the
cheaper process would take longer for them to fulfill their quotas).!
Linov also noted that the piles are utilized for buildings which are
anywhere from 2 to 17 stories high. In the United States, this type
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of deep foundation is avoided for low rise structures due to the
prohibitive cost.
BUILDING STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS
Building regulations and standards are clearly spelled out in a book
which is kept in libraries. The standards are the same for the entire
country. According to Alexander Tovbeen, it is desirable to have
"...the same level of comfort for all.". For example, the space allotted
for one, two and three room flats as well as specific room lay-outs is
all standardized. Utilities such as heating, hot water, and fire
protection are also standardized.
Although the written building regulations are very stringent, more
stringent than in the U.S. in fact, the application of the standards is
quite different. This became evident one day as we walked through
a series of kitchen-garden lots. The lots were 600 square meters.
Every lot had a small house built on it as was permitted. When
asked how sewage would be handled, we were told that each lot
would have it's own septic tank, or out-house. I noted that the lots
were very small, and that the water table was quite high (difficult
for percolation). We were told that the written standards did not
allow for this type of sewage system, but that the people had no
access to any other type of system, so the inspector would have to
permit it. In contrast, both of the Finnish and Swedish contractor
who are involved in renovation projects in Leningrad, commented
that the building inspectors went through their buildings with fine
tooth combs. Tommie Erikson of SIAB noted that several times they
had to invite an inspector to Sweden to demonstrate SIAB's high
work standards in order to get a sign off on a drawing. Apparently
officials are well aware that if they sit on the drawings long enough,
they will get a trip outside the Soviet Union. This process
unfortunately has fed upon itself. Inspectors seem to enforce the
standards for their own benefit, not for the protection of the people.
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THELABORFORCE
The communist doctrine, in it's safe guard against inequality, has not
provided adequately for worker incentives. Workers at all levels
and in all professions are reported to lack dedication to their jobs
and a sense of pride in their work. A director of one of the newest
institutes in Leningrad bragged that of his employees, 30% were
competent, efficient workers. He said that on average, only 5% of the
work force could be considered responsible and diligent. Apparently,
workers are not highly motivated by money. In talking to a Finish
contractor in the process of completing work in Leningrad, he
revealed that his company had a great deal of trouble working with
Russian construction laborers. Even with double pay and other
benefits the workers showed up late and lacked initiative. It is hard
to spend money because of the lack of material goods in the stores;
this may explain the workers attitude.
A large majority of the construction workers in Leningrad come from
the out-lying rural areas. Due to the shortage of workers, these
people are quickly hired for construction work, but they must wait
ten years for housing. In the interim, they are housed in
dormitories. The job of a construction worker is not highly sought
after. For nine months out of the year, the climate is not conducive
to working outside, with only four hours of daylight in the winter,
and temperatures hovering around zero degrees Celsius. Equipment
is generally in short supply. There are large cranes for lifting the
panels into place, but there are virtually no electric hand tools. This
forces the laborers to cut holes in concrete slabs with hammers and
chisels. In addition, workers are not compensated for the harsh
working conditions. They earn the average wage of 250 rubles per
month. (At the exchange rate of .6 rubles to a dollar, this equals $150
U.S.).
Section 5.) Building Management
Within the Leningrad City Council there are two departments
associated with building management. The first is the Housing Board
which is responsible for everyday building maintenance. The second
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is the Renovation committee which does major reconstruction on
buildings as needed.
In our visit to various homes, it was immediately obvious that there
is a general lack of attention to building maintenance. More than a
few entrance-ways had overhangs that seemed loosely attached to
the building. Stoops seem to consist of flimsy wooden crates which
sit on top of the ground and move with the foot traffic. They often
have holes punched in them from wear. Stair-wells are not kept
clean or well lit. Boris Nikolilaschenko, the Deputy Chief of GENPLAN
in Leningrad stated that "...the resident is alienated from the owner
(City Council) and no one takes responsibility for building
maintenance. The owner doesn't depend on the maintenance of his
housing for prosperity." Formally, the housing board is responsible
for maintenance, however they are not held accountable for any of
this work. Mr. Nikolilaschenko noted that the basic system for
determining which buildings need repair is based on the age of the
building rather than the actual condition of the structure. This
system is highly inefficient due to the fact that most of the older
buildings, those built before the advent of the panelized method in
1930, were built better than the newer buildings. As mentioned
previously, the concrete panel systems begin to degenerate after
three years, and the buildings life span is only 20 years.
The Renovation Committee is primarily responsible for the historic
structures located in the the old town of Leningrad. These buildings
date from 1427 to 1917 and encompass such styles as Early Russian,
Moscow Baroque, Petrine Baroque (influenced by Peter the Great),
Gothic, Russian Classical, and Eclectic. These buildings are graced
with an opulence of ornamentation characteristic of their period.
Certainly these structures are a rich part of Russian heritage, even
though they recall the era of wealth and prosperity of White Russia.
The majority of the structures are made of brick which has been
covered with a stucco finish then painted. The color of the buildings
today reveal the era in which they were constructed. A visitor sight-
seeing in Leningrad is struck by the rich ochres, teals, greens and
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reds of the building facades. Stucco is a difficult building material to
use in moist climates, it requires annual repainting, which must
occupy a large portion of the maintenance crews. For the most part,
the buildings in the center of town, which are seen by foreign
visitors, are kept in reasonable shape on the exterior. However, it
was rather surprising to see that the interior spaces have hardly
changed since the 1900's. This is particularly evident in the
electrical and plumbing systems which are quite primitive and
bordering on dangerous.
The renovation process, as described to us by Boris Nikolilaschenko,
consists of tearing down all horizontal elements (roofs, floors, and
ceilings), while leaving all the vertical members standing.
Unfortunately, bracing is often not used properly during demolition
which causes the walls to fall down. An example was given of
Pushkin's House which was recently renovated. Pushkin, "...revered
in the Soviet Union as both a great writer and the liberator of the
Russian literary language... "29, lived in Leningrad in a small house
which has become a museum and a site of significance and pride for
the people of Leningrad. As the demolition crew removed the roof
and then the floor, the walls began to fall down as well. Fortunately,
the facade was saved, but the rest of the building was rebuilt of pre-
cast concrete. Today, 3 to 4 years after the renovation, the structure
is in critical condition.
The renovation committee's effectiveness, like the builders, is based
on a quota of how much money they have spent; the more money
spent, the better they are fulfilling their job. This has allowed
buildings which require more costly work to be renovated before
buildings which are in the most need. Often complaints from high
ranking citizens will cause their building to be put at the top of the
list.
29 Mawdsley, Evan and Margaret, Blue Guide: Moscow and Leningrad. (Ernest
Benn Limited, 1980), pg. 23
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In Leningrad, it is evident that the building owner has no vested
interest in building maintenance. In a market based system,
landlords will normally maintain their buildings to protect the
properties value. In the Soviet Union, the lack of price mechanisms
for valuing goods such as buildings, has caused a general lack of
concern for upkeep. Corruption within the building management
agency has allowed funds to be siphoned into other areas. Buildings
are in serious need of repair,and the cost of this repair will now cost
more than new construction. The extreme need for extensive
building maintenance, coupled with the inefficient practices of the
renovation committee has detracted funds away from new housing
production. This problem will become more severe over the next
few years as more buildings fall into serious disrepair.
Section 6) Summary of the State System
In summary, the concrete panel system has been the dominant form
of construction during the communist era. The reasons can be
recapitulated as follows:
. The speed of production of the panel and the
subsequent erection of buildings.
. The ability to standardize both the panels and the
housing units; this proliferated "equality in poverty".
. The manufacturing of the panels required few workers,
with little or no skills.
. The ability to exclusively use cement, the most readily
available material.
The centralized control of housing production which manifested the
concrete panel system did meet the political needs of the state until
about 1960. At that time its shortfalls began to be evidenced, yet
production continues today virtually unaltered. The production
system has become one of the major obstacles to meeting the housing
demand. The system was built on the premise of producing housing
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quickly, but it has forgone quality issues. This has created buildings
which begin to decompose within three years, with a maximum life
span of twenty years. The inherent nature of the panel system
makes it virtually impossible to repair. The lack of general
maintenance to the buildings has accelerated the deterioration
process. Thus, Leningrad is faced with a city of buildings that will
cost more to repair, than to build anew.
It is apparent that the existing state sponsored system will not be
the cure for the housing problem. Where are the glimmers of hope?
The following chapter will present alternative opportunities for
meeting the housing shortages.
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CHAPTER III ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION TYPES
Michael Gorbachev's decree calls for the 'private' industry to produce
roughly 10 million housing units by the year 2000. Exactly what the
private industry is, or how they will mobilize their resources is not
defined. However, there exists in the Soviet Union three types of
builders who operate outside of the state directed system. They are
the co-operatives, the self-initiated builders, and the foreign
contractors. In general, these three types of builders currently do
little to alleviate the housing problem. However, these burgeoning
industries may play a key role in the future in meeting the
consumers demand for adequate space, and higher living standards.
A brief look at how they are currently structured will allow for an
evaluation of how they might be expanded in the future.
Section 1.) Co-operatives
The word co-operative is commonly applied to two different kinds of
entities. There is the co-operative form of tenure in which a group of
people organize together and 'buy' their own apartments from the
state. This is very similar to cooperative living in the United States.
'Co-operative' also applies to a recent phenomena in the Soviet Union
which approximates private enterprise. To avoid sounding too much
like a capitalistic entity, the word co-operative has been chosen.
Lenin, who tried co-operatives in the 1920's, said that [Socialism is a]
"society of civilized cooperators." 30 The following is concerned with
the co-operative as a business entity.
As part of the restructuring of management under Perestroika, there
was the recognition that individuals and enterprises must be brought
into the process. "What lies at the root of the new system of
administration is the offer of economic independence to the various
enterprises and conglomerates which make up our national
economy...A large co-operative sector is to exist alongside the state
30 Smith, Hedrick, Inside Gorbachev's USSR, (documentary produced by WGBH,
Boston)
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enterprises. We have already seen a leap in personal productivity,
which in due course will spread to every aspect of the economy." 3 1
A law establishing co-operatives has been in effect since July 1988.
Basically this law allows co-operatives to operate as private
enterprises, yet the lack of material and financial resources to
support co-operatives has greatly hindered their growth.
Today some 200,000 co-operatives exist.3 2  In 1988 co-operatives
earned 4 billion rubles in production and services, and employed 2
million people. 33 Most co-operatives are formed by individuals with
an entrepreneurial spirit. According to Richard Kirkland of Fortune
Magazine, "Two things unite the managers who run these enterprises:
their lack of faith in what Gorbachev has called 'a regulated market
economy' and their ardent desire to escape the iron grip of the state
by winning the right to own private companies." 34 Andrei Fyodorov,
an owner of a first class Moscow restaurant was quoted as saying,
"Some 80% of our so-called co-operatives are pure private business.
These people pay their workers well, but they don't ask the workers
how they should divide the profits. They're owners. I'm an owner" 35
These people may consider themselves owners, but the truth is that
at any time they could be shut down by the government. Although
they may operate their businesses under free enterprise principles,
they are still an island in the midst of communism. Every ashtray,
morsel of food, or part for a factory must be secured through either
bureaucratic channels or the black market. The government still has
tight reins on these race horses for a market economy. A look at how
these enterprises are actually operating is revealing.
Kirkland 's article tells of Mikhail Bocharov, the head of a brick and
lumber plant outside Moscow. Bocharov was one of the first to
31 Aganbegyan, pg. 2
32 Kirkland, Richard I. Jr., Can Capitalism Save Perestroika, Fortune July 30,
1990, pg. 138
33 Aganbegyan, pg. 2
34 Kirkland, pg. 138
35 Kirkland, pg. 138
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persuade the government to 'lease' a factory to a group of workers.
The workers all put in a small sum, and the government loaned the
remainder. Mr. Bocharov took this opportunity to create a retail
outlet for the sale of bricks and lumber to be sold to individual
builders. "Sales jumped 50% from 1987-1989, and the plant went
from requiring an annual state subsidy of 150,000 rubles to earning
a small profit." 3 6  According to Mr. Bacharov, "Allowing private
ownership is the only way to motivate people to work. It must be
the number one issue of any serious reform."
In January 1990, Bacharov formed a holding company, BUTEK, that in
essence permits an enterprise which buys its assets from the state to
become a 'private company'. "The managers can make any deal they
like with foreign or domestic partners and no longer have to take
orders from their former masters in the Moscow ministries." 37 Of
course Bacharov's recent appointment to the Supreme Soviet has
greatly facilitated this venture.
Another example of a co-operative enterprise is that of Mark
Masarsky as depicted in Hedrick Smith's documentary, Inside
Gorbachev's USSR. Masarsky borrowed 1 million rubles from the
state to buy a run down brick factory on the outskirts of Novgorod,
near Leningrad. The factory was formerly a prison where 350
prisoners worked to produce 12 million bricks in one year.
Masarsky, with 90 workers and new equipment, has doubled
production. Currently there are 800 workers employed by Mr.
Masarsky to build roads, erect houses or make bricks. Each worker
has a share in the business. Masarsky, in the spirit of 'co-operation',
allots himself a salary which is only two and a half times the pay of a
worker. On average, workers receive 1000 rubles a month, roughly
four times the national average.
36 Kirkland, pg. 138
37 Kirkland, pg. 141, as quoted by Mikhail Bacharov
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Masarsky's original intent was to build quality houses out of brick
and wood. However he has been stymied by the lack of wood.
According to Masarsky, "All the lumber in Novgorod is under the
thumb of this one man. Aleksander Bochan, the state supervisor of
timber." 38 At one time Masarsky leased a lumber mill from Bochan,
but the state demanded all the output, and left no lumber for his
house building enterprise. When asked why he could not give more
lumber to Masarsky, Buchan replied, "They will fire me if I do not
fulfill the state plan. I have no other way except for doing what I am
told to do. In order to give him lumber, I would have to produce
more, but I do not have either human or technological resources." 3 9
When Masarsky leased the mill, he had 100 workers gainfully
employed here. But since Buchan stepped in, production has
virtually stopped. Masarsky commented that "The state is a
monopolist, not capable of taking advantage of its wealth because
nobody wants to work for it. We have workers. Combining [Buchan's]
resources and my skills, we could have a treasure here." 4 0
In the meantime, Masarsky has been building pre-fab homes, but
"...at the state's orders, the state's fixed prices, and using inferior
materials supplied by the state." 4 1 A tour of these homes reveals the
effect of using poor materials. The walls are uneven and had to be
finished by the tenants with newspaper to make them smooth. Most
of the finishing work was never done due to lack of materials. The
occupant of the house is quite unhappy with the results, as is Mark
Masarsky. The occupant noted that, "The state is happy all right.
They decided that before the year 2000, each of their workers gets [a
place to live]. But the state doesn't care whether the families are
happy or not. They made a check; filled a square." 4 2
38 Smith, pg. 5
39 Smith, pg. 5
40 Smith, pg. 5
41 Smith, pg. 5
42 Smith, pg. 5
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As is evident by Mark Masarsky's experience, there exist many
talented, ambitious individuals who are willing to work hard and
achieve results. The state has held a carrot in front of these people,
but the reality is that there is nothing behind the carrot. Some
entrepreneurs have been soured by this experience and don't believe
that the government will ever loosen it's grip on the economy.
Others are garnering their success with trepidation: successful
enterprises are more likely to be shut down by zealous bureaucrats.
Section 2.) Self-initiated Home Builders
The individual house builder has always existed in the the Soviet
Union, although support from both the state and local government
has steadily decreased over time. The historical record outlined in
chapter I indicates a pattern of behavior: the government continually
promises decrees which appear to be for the benefit of the people.
Yet there is no means for either enforcing the decree, or for
implementation. Today, only one million4 3 single family homes exist,
most are in rural areas and in varying degrees of decay. However, it
is clear that individual construction has played a significant role in
the past, and if supported by resources and financing, could
contribute significantly in the future.
KITCHEN GARDEN PLOTS
Today, the only form of individual construction occurring in any
quantity is for the provision of a second home. According to Valentin
Nazarov, Director of GENPLAN in Leningrad, "the tradition of a second
home is a very deep rooted Russian tradition". Most of these second
homes are built on kitchen-garden plots. The government instituted
kitchen garden plots just after World War II to alleviate food
shortages. Prior to 1960 only state officials were permitted access to
garden plots. Currently there are 300,000 garden plots in the
suburbs of Leningrad. This number is expected to grow to 500,000
in the near future. Mr. Nazarov also noted that 'gardening is a deep
43 Nazarov, Valentin, Director of LENNIITAG, (June 15, 1990)
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rooted tradition due to the number of rural dwellers who have been
transplanted to the city. Owning a garden plot allows these people to
revert back to their days of farming.' In reality, the limited supply
of quality fruits and vegetables, coupled with cramped living
conditions is probably the driving force for most. In any case, the
provision of land for gardening has caused the advent of individual
home builders for second homes.
The right to a kitchen garden is often acquired through the work
place.. Companies (factories), will procure a tract of land from the
Leningrad Council. Committee members from within the company
are elected to organize a co-op, and subdivide the land into 'plots'.
In general, garden plots are 600 square meters, (1,968 square feet).
Over the years different rules have existed regarding what is
permissible to build on these lots. Outside of Leningrad, we visited a
new dacha (Russian term for second home), under construction.
These dachas were permitted a floor plate of 50 sq. meters, but there
is no limit on height. Although these standards exist today, they are
constantly changing and rarely enforced. These buildings are
somewhat crude in construction, but they are utilized for weekend
accommodations all year round.
In general, the co-ops organize the construction of roads. The state
provides electricity to the site. Access to water is generally done
through private wells, or there may be a fresh water hook-up
provided. Sanitation is the biggest problem. Each unit is expected to
install its own out-house or septic tank. It should be noted that the
water table throughout the region around Leningrad is very high,
within one to three feet. Also, the lot size of 600 sq. meters is
limited, forcing houses to be located right next to each other. These
are not optimal conditions for individual waste disposal.
On our visit to a co-op site, we were impressed with the image
portrayed of 'homesteading', something akin to how our ancestors
settled land 100 years ago. The land has been roughly cleared with
crude tools. Dirt roads and plots have been laid out. Materials are
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hauled to the site by private cars or borrowed trucks. Every
member of the family is busy contributing to some aspect of the
process. In general the dachas are constructed of wood with concrete
block perimeter foundations. Construction techniques are fairly
primitive, but in viewing an area which had been constructed several
years ago, the end result is quite charming; a series of over grown
doll houses with neatly tended gardens.
Section 3.) The Role of Foreign Contractors
Foreign contractors engaged in work in the USSR offer a form of short
term assistance for the Soviets during a transition away from the
industrialized process. Currently there are about 15 foreign
contractors doing work in the Soviet Union. The majority of these
firms are Finnish, Swedish, or Italian. They operate either on a fee
basis, or they form joint ventures with Soviet agencies. These
contractors are attracted by the tremendous opportunity in the
Soviet Union. To give an example, proposed projects are often pre-
leased so quickly that construction financing seldom has to be
secured. In general these firms are constructing either office or hotel
space for Westerners who will pay in hard currency, until the ruble
is convertible with other currencies. This is the only way the
contractors can extract their profits.
Currently in Leningrad, there are two foreign contractors engaged in
work. YIT, which is a the largest construction company in Finland
and has operated in the USSR for 30 years, and SIAB, which is a
Swedish construction firm.engaged in their first Russian venture.
Both companies are renovating historic hotels to be used by
INTOURIST, Russia's national tourist agency, for western guests. A
visit to both construction sites is like visiting an island of high
technology. These companies employ highly skilled workers from
East Germany and Scandinavia. They have the latest in electrical
tools and trucks. The sites are extremely orderly with strict safety
precautions evident. All tools, trucks, and equipment, plus 99% of
the materials are brought by truck from Sweden and Finland. The
only materials bought from the Soviets were sand, gravel, cement
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and reinforcing steel. According to Tommie Erikson, the assistant site
manager for the SIAB project, his company would have preferred not
to buy any materials from the Soviets, but it was stipulated in their
contract. Erikson's reasoning is that the Soviets are often late in
bringing materials to the site; sometimes threats are the only way to
get results.
YIT has been engaged in renovating the Astoria Hotel for 39 months.
When they began, they hired several Russian workers as a sign of
good will. According to project manager Jukka Suominen, it is
difficult to find Russian workers with skills. "They don't know the
language [English or Finnish], and they are lazy". YIT pays their
Russian workers close to double the national average wage. Workers
also receive assorted benefits such as access to goods from
Scandinavia. The doubling of salary, although a carrot in market
based economies, holds virtually no significance in the Soviet Union
since there are so few goods to purchase. However, Suominen
continues, "Russian workers, if treated fairly and paid well, are very
loyal. But Soviets are not used to trusting."
Most of the foreign companies doing business in the Soviet Union are
benefitting themselves, and a few Soviet bureaucrats. The people in
general do not share in any of the profit or rewards. If anything,
these five star hotels for Western dollars only, are likely to bring
resentment. The wealth of knowledge and resources which the
contractors have access to is slipping between the cracks. Soviet
agencies should look at how the foreign contractors can help alleviate
their construction industry woes. Foreign contractors can offer a
short term gain to the Soviets. By training workers, the Soviets can
re-introduce traditional construction methods, and begin to build
high quality buildings.
Section 4.) Access to Building Materials
The securing of building materials is one of the most difficult tasks
for independent builders and co-operatives, it is also the key to their
livelihood. The following sources are the most common:
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1) STATE RETAIL STORES - The state has set up retail stores for
selling building materials, but these stores currently have no
stock. Theoretically, these shops have been set up to sell houses
as kits to be assembled on site.
2) FACTORIES - State owned enterprises are allowed to sell materials
to workers. These supplies are either produced at the factory, or
are materials which the factory buys from GOSNOB which are in
"excess". Factories will also sell materials 'out the back door', a
contributor to the black market
3) RIGHT TO ACCESS - Materials may be 'lifted' from the factory by
workers. Under communism, "everything belongs to the people".
People take advantage of this doctrine and take the materials
home to be utilized for their own house.
4) IMPORTED SUPPLIES - Co-operatives or individuals may buy
goods in hard currency from foreign contractors currently
operating within the Soviet Union. Or they may have the goods
imported. This is very costly and few people have access to hard
currency.
5) BLACK MARKET - There exists a secondary market throughout the
Soviet Union. Through connections and back alley deal making,
virtually anything can be bought on the black market, for a price.
Section 5.) Summary
The use of alternative builders has, in the past contributed to the
housing supply both in adding to the stock, and in allowing the
workers to take initiative for improving their living conditions. Co-
operatives and self initiated builders could play a large role in the
supply of housing, but they must be empowered. Materials, financial
resources for loans, quality land parcels, and access to tools and new
technology must be readily accessible. Foreign contractors can be an
aid during this transition by supplying materials, tools, and technical
training for workers through on-site experience. If Gorbachev is
serious about utilizing 'private' means for housing construction,
muscle has to be put behind these words.
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CHAPTER IV LESSONS LEARNED/
A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
The historical perspective has revealed the strong influence of the
Bauhaus movement While this era originally epitomized architects
acting as the cultural benefactors for the users, the communist
regime has captured this notion and clung to it for decades. This has
not allowed for any maturation of the movement, as occurred in
Europe and the United States. The strong influence of this movement
has allowed party liners to promote one notion which has not
changed for 50 years. This is evident in Valentin Nazarov's myopic
vision that only high rise concrete panel apartment buildings can
cure the country's woes.
The industrialized panel system did meet the country's post war
political objectives to utilize a work force of unskilled laborers, and
to build homes with the most available resource, concrete. The
system allowed for a standardization to take place for the whole
country. The industrialized method allowed for a socially correct
'sameness' to prevail in the countryside. The political ideology of
communism, 'equality for all' dictated a building form. which did
meet political needs until 1960. During the 60's, the flaws with the
industrialized method began to appear. However, the process
continues today virtually unchanged.
The power of the centralized government to monopolize every
industry has had a crippling effect on the entire economy. The
government's attempt to plan details down to how many pencils a
company is to receive has not empowered the government, but
rather allowed it to rule a disintegrating society. In particular, the
government's fear of foreign invasion, caused the directing of
resources to meet military goals, leaving housing and the domestic
economy to virtually stagnant for 50 years.
In Leningrad it was evident that the control of the bureaucratic
powers has caused numerous inefficiencies with in the system. Blind
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decisions, such as utilizing a porous panel for the exterior of a
building is but one example. The short life span of these panels, (20
years), coupled with the difficulty of repairing them, has actually
done more to create a housing shortage than to alleviate it. This will
become more 'evident in the next ten years as these buildings reach
their life span prognosis. The simplicity of the industrialized process
does have appealing virtues. However, the marriage to this one
system has caused worker skills to deteriorate, and a lack of
awareness of new technology. The industrialized system has
dedicated tremendous resources to constructing factories which will
be difficult to utilize for anything else.
The built environment in Leningrad, as created over the last 50
years, has become the physical embodiment of the centralized
structure. There is virtually no variation in building appearance.
Architecture does not define building design, but rather a
mechanized, repetitive form. Children can't even find their way back
home without the aid of colored ribbons. People have become
alienated from their habitats. This has created a lack of pride in
dwellings, and a lack of care in the maintenance of the structures
which has further contributed to their deterioration.
The lack of incentive amongst the labor pool to do an effective job is
also a result of the centralized system. The lack of basic tools and
equipment creates ridiculous tasks such as chiseling holes in concrete
in zero degree weather.
The bureaucratic system has allowed corruption to fester. From
building inspectors to material suppliers, people with power have
used it to protect themselves from the unknowns of the system.
Lack of pricing mechanisms has also allowed for inefficiencies. This
has resulted in methods of production which are the most costly,
rather than the best solution. This is particularly evident in the case
of the builders who operate from a quota basis rather than a cost
accounting basis.
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In summary, field work in Leningrad revealed four paramount
problems within the existing state sponsored system:
. The state sponsored industrialized process for
producing housing is highly inefficient and incapable of
solving the housing problem in Leningrad.
. The monopoly of control over material distribution by
GOSNOB has caused extreme material shortages.
- The labor force in general lacks adequate skills and is
unmotivated.
. The infrastructure throughout the city of Leningrad has
been steadily deteriorating since the advent of
Perestroika.
- Recent state level reforms which call for top down
changes, have caused more confusion, than solutions.
The system is structurally flawed. But there are glimmers of hope.
The past success of self-initiated builders in significantly
contributing to the stock of housing, as well as the entrepreneurial
spirit of the co-operatives is indicative of what can be done if people
are given the opportunity. The construction of the dachas on
kitchen/garden plots reveals the resourcefulness and the desire
amongst the people to better their situation. If the role of co-
operatives and individual home builders is expanded, and outside
resources such as the technology and skills provided by foreign
contractors are utilized, it is feasible that future housing will meet
consumer needs.
Specifically, to overcome the existing situation in Leningrad, change
must occur at both the state level and the local level. Changes at the
state level involve restructuring the management of the economy,
the implementation of price mechanisms, and the convertibility of
the ruble, to name a few. Changes at the state level are highly
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complex and outside the realms of this research. However, specific
changes at the local level should address the following:
- THE CENTRALIZED SYSTEM-The system for planning
and constructing housing must be realigned. A
multiplicity of house producing enterprises must be
developed at the local level.
* BUILDING MATERIALS-Alternative materials to
concrete must be developed New infrastructure for
processing materials must be created through the use
of enterprises and co-operatives. In particular,
indigenous materials such as wood should be exploited.
. LABOR-A means for training and educating the labor
force must be implemented. Utilizing foreign
technology will be very helpful. Wages must be based
on expertise and worker efficiency.
- ACCESS TO CAPITAL-On the demand side, a mortgage
system is required to utilize private funds to purchase
homes. On the supply side, a banking system is a
prerequisite for the provision of loans to facilitate the
formation of building co-operatives and enterprises.
The top-down reforms which have been passed under Perestroika
have had little to no effect on the people of Leningrad. In fact, over
the last five years their standards of living have been declining.
There is less food in the shops, the roads are filled with holes, and
their housing is literally crumbling. These people have become
restless. Grass-roots movements are beginning to form. Evidence of
this is present at the Leningrad City Council. The recent free
elections by the populace has put into place individuals who will not
bow down to the state government decrees.
Change such as what is happening in the Leningrad City Council are
what must occur if the government is truly to change historical
precedents and implement beneficial reforms. The difficulty lies in
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trying to peacefully implement top-down and bottom-up reform
simultaneously. As other members of the Warsaw Pact have amply
demonstrated over the last year, revolutionary change is more
expedient when the government is overthrown.
For the immediate future, the next ten years look to be a time of
tumultuous change for the Soviet Union. The advent of Perestroika
may have long term gains, but in the short term , as Marshall
Goldman noted, 'the society is disintegrating.' 4 4 The pull of the
parties to one extreme or the other has caused tremendous
imbalance. Gorbachev sits at the Center of the stage in a most
precarious position. He must appease the old party liners who want
to maintain their power base, and appeal to the millions of workers
who are demanding a better way of life.
Will Gorbachev be able to provide a home for every family by the
year 2000? Will the housing situation in Leningrad improve?
Chances are history will repeat itself. The Soviet Union is poised
right now in one of the most delicate stations in it's history. The
progress made to date by conscientious politicians and motivated
individuals has taken more courage than we as Westerners can begin
to understand. The challenged faced is far more difficult than
starting from a war torn country as Europe did. The world is
watching the evolution of Perestroika and the hopeful birth of a
democratic state. Hopefully adequate shelter will be a keystone to
this new society.
44 Goldman, Marshall, Associate Director of the Russian Research Center,
Harvard University
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